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FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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The Hungarian Revolution and the UN

by Emil Lengyel

At its forthcoming session in September the General Assembly of the United Nations will consider the Hungarian question on the basis of the recently published report of its Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary. This important document was signed with no reservations by the five committee members, and it is likely to stand as the most authentic history of the Hungarian revolution which began October 23, 1956.

The uprising was not planned in advance and took even the participants by surprise, gathering momentum as it rushed on its headlong course. The report confirms previous accounts that the first shots were fired by members of the AVH, State Defense Authority, and not by the insurgents.

The Soviets and their Magyar puppets, on the other hand, have insisted that what happened in Hungary was a counterrevolution, abetted by foreign powers and Fascists. The committee found "no evidence whatsoever to suggest that any political personality associated with the prewar regime exerted the slightest influence on events."

As early as October 20 the Soviets, according to the report, took steps to render inter-

vention in Hungary possible, even though there were no signs of advance planning. But, as the committee points out, "obscurity surrounds the invitation alleged to have been issued by the Hungarian government to the Soviet authorities to assist in quelling the uprising by force."

This is precisely the heart of the controversy. The Janos Kadar regime of Hungary asserts that the Budapest government had called for the assistance of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary under the Warsaw Defense Treaty. But that treaty provided for the collective self-defense of the signatories, including both the U.S.S.R. and Hungary, in the event of an armed attack. The committee finds that there was no such attack and that the Soviet action in Hungary was foreign intervention. Since the report was issued, Gyorgy Marosan, Hungarian minister of state, has publicly accepted responsibility for the first use of Soviet troops against the Hungarian insurgents, according to *The New York Times* of July 31.

The committee also finds that it was proper for the revolutionary government of Imre Nagy to invoke UN help. According to the

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report, the Nagy cabinet was legal, while its successor, the Kadar regime, is illegal.

The committee does not go into the question as to how legitimacy is transferred in a revolution. Even some of the most stable governments of the world could not stand the test if the transfer of power were a criterion. The Nagy cabinet got its power from Erno Gero, Stalinist first secretary of the Hungarian Workers' party (Communist), and did not derive its mandate from an election. The rule of its successor, the Kadar government, is not based on a popular mandate either. The Kadar government is recognized by all major Western powers, including the United States, which maintain diplomatic relations with it.

The Kadar government takes the stand that the Soviets interfered within the purview of the Warsaw treaty and that the UN has no jurisdiction to deal with this "purely domestic question." The question of legitimacy emphasized by the special committee is thus not one of the strongest arguments in its armory.

The special committee gives a valuable hour-by-hour report about the events of the crucial November 1. At 4:00 P.M. the Nagy cabinet adopted a Declaration of Neutrality for Hungary. At 5:00 P.M. it invited the Soviet ambassador to its meeting; informed him of its decision, and conveyed the news to the other diplomatic mission heads, asking "for the aid of the four great powers in defense of Hungary's neutrality."

Again, the committee does not go

into this vital question of neutrality but turns to the description of the Soviet intervention. Yet, the decision on Hungary's neutrality may have been a precipitant of the ensuing events. The committee could have profitably compared the Soviet Union's action in Hungary with its reactions toward previous events in Poland and Austria.

Why Not a 'Polish Solution'?

In May 1955 the Soviets signed the Austrian State Treaty, recognizing Austrian neutrality. Just a few days before the Hungarian uprising the Kremlin accepted the "national communism" of the same Wladyslaw Gomulka whom they had persecuted for years. If neutrality was acceptable to them in Austria, and Gomulka in Poland, why were not neutrality and the "national Communist" Nagy acceptable to them in Hungary?

Was Hungary refused what had been granted to Austria and Poland because of the different context of events? Austria, Hungary and Poland mean the same to Russia that Mexico and Canada mean to us. It may have accepted Vienna's neutralism and Warsaw's heresy as calculated risks but did not feel like going beyond them.

There is still another matter which this richly documented report overlooked; a pertinent but very ticklish subject—anti-Semitism in Hungary. The revolution cut across religious lines: Catholics, the largest denomination, Protestants and Jews. Both Nagy and Kadar are of peasant stock, but their government predecessors

were "intellectuals" of the Jewish faith, even though they did not so consider themselves. Their backgrounds were well known in Hungary and caused many anti-Semitic remarks. Were there anti-Semitic outbreaks during the revolution itself? And if so, were they significant? There were sporadic outbursts of anti-Semitism, but nobody can know how significant they were. The Hungarians expected everything from America, and they did not want to jeopardize everything by pogroms.

Now that the UN Assembly will discuss the Hungarian issue again, the United States will lead the Western team. The West would be in a stronger position if something were done about the 32,000 Hungarian refugees in Austria, the 6,500 refugees in Yugoslavia, and others elsewhere. Secretary of State Franz Grubhofer of the Austrian Ministry of Interior told the writer that, at best, his country could absorb only 15,000 refugees. What an impression would be created everywhere if the United States were to admit a large number of the remaining refugees. Many refugees already admitted are here as "parolees," a term usually applied to criminals. Why let uncertainty sap their strength, and why not admit them unconditionally? Apart from being a humane act, it would also be a victory in the cold-war battle for mankind's friendship.

Hungarian-born Dr. Emil Lengyel, who teaches at New York University, has recently returned from a trip to Austria and the refugee camps for Hungarians. He is the author of several books about Eastern Europe and the *Headline Series* "Eastern Europe Today."

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347

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Status of the President's Leadership

With the ending of the present session of Congress, the first in President Eisenhower's second and last term of office, many observers in Washington are taking stock of both his program and leadership in foreign and domestic affairs. Congress has either delayed or cast aside key measures of the President's legislative program and has failed to follow his recommendations on others.

There appears to be no single answer as to why he is having trouble getting his program on foreign aid, defense, civil rights, school construction, the budget and other measures through Congress. But there is a combination of answers which seems to informed observers to throw light on the President's problem.

In foreign policy he has faced several crucial issues in the little more than six months of his second term. Undoubtedly the foremost achievement of this period was the gaining of congressional support for the Eisenhower Doctrine. The rift which arose between Washington and London and Paris over the British-French attack on Suez has also largely been healed. But the President's foreign aid program has been delayed, and the appropriations sought have been reduced. Other proposals, such as that for United States participation in the Organization for Trade Cooperation (a body which would administer the international General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), will be carried over to the 1958 session of the present Congress.

It would be expected that President Eisenhower, whose popularity with the voter is undiminished in the country, could count on the support of the voters' representatives in Con-

gress. But that is not proving to be so. It is true that the Congress is Democratic and the Administration is Republican. But that political division of responsibility at most plays only a small part in the present situation. Also it appears that the President is more interested in foreign affairs than in domestic matters and that therefore on many of the latter issues he has taken a less active part in support of the Administration's proposals.

Factors Involved

The factors, however, which seem to be the most important in explaining the lessening of the President's leadership are as follows: (1) Congress is only reflecting a national economy-mood when it trims programs that cost money; (2) this being the President's last term, because of the 22nd Amendment to the Constitution, his influence with Congress is bound to deteriorate; and (3) the President has undercut the causes he supports by indecision on issues and has thereby confused, if not antagonized, Congressmen.

Of these factors, the last appears to be more important than either of the first two. Of course, where heavy Federal spending is required, the national desire for economy is quickly sensed by the Congress. And the fact that the Administration has encouraged this economy-mindedness among citizens cannot but return to plague the President on specific bills and issues. While it is more difficult to measure the extent to which the President's influence is curtailed by virtue of the 22nd Amendment, certainly no Congressman is unaware that there is a definite time limit to

the authority President Eisenhower can exert as Chief Executive and party leader.

In the view of many of his closest observers, the most decisive factor affecting the President's leadership—his indecision on certain issues—grows out of his greatest strength. The characteristic which made him invaluable as Supreme Allied Commander during World War II—the ability to weigh, measure and compromise to get disputing generals to agree—is a principal source of his troubles with Congress. When bitter political division over legislative policy arises, his inclination is not to take sides, but rather to try to stay above the battle. Illustrative of these attitudes were the varied positions he took on the budget, the school construction bill and the civil rights legislation. Similarly, on the foreign aid bill the President's original proposals were, like the budget, first trimmed by the Administration only to be cut further by Congress.

It is well known that President Eisenhower's conception of his office makes him reluctant to wear the two hats of President and party leader simultaneously. In this respect he has differed markedly from his two immediate predecessors, Presidents Roosevelt and Truman. But regardless of the relative importance of the above factors in measuring his present effectiveness with Congress, the fact that it has been reduced during the last half year is widely recognized. His unpolitical approach to basically political matters has, however, affected the outcome of domestic issues more than those of foreign policy.

NEAL STANFORD



In Asia: Old Problems — New Answers

BANGKOK—In this age of jet planes and lightning-speed communications between human beings nothing stands still for very long—not even the once seemingly somnolent East. Skyscraper office buildings shoot up along the skyline of Hong Kong's magnificent harbor. On the main street of Japan's ancient city of shrines, Nikko, advertisements of local stores spoken by a feminine voice blare over a loud-speaker. The narrow streets of Bangkok, which has experienced a phenomenal growth in the past decade, become a hopeless, screeching tangle of cars and cycle-rickshaws at rush hours. The neon signs of garish night clubs illumine Singapore's black-velvet nights.

Yet the new—contributed by the technology of the West and of Asia's only advanced industrial nation, Japan, and gifts or loans from the United States—has not completely displaced the old. The two ways of life coexist side by side. In many Japanese offices the abacus is used along with the elaborate calculating machine. The Thai shopkeeper along the Menam River, whose shelves are stocked with American soap flakes and canned goods, still performs his ablutions, brushes his teeth and washes his pots and pans in the river's gray waters. One of Japan's most elaborate rituals is taught with all its exquisite intricacies at the Urasenke School of Tea Ceremonial in Kyoto, an oasis of serenity amidst the ancient capital's modern hustle.

This survival of the ancient alongside the modern—sometimes with clashes, open or suppressed, but often with unself-conscious acceptance of both—challenges Arnold Toynbee's thesis that the non-West cannot

choose this or that element of Western life for incorporation into its own but must take it in its entirety—or not at all. It challenges, too, all those, both Westerners and non-Westerners, who thought there were pat answers to age-old problems.

Of these problems, three particularly stand out at this moment in history.

Nation—or Multiracial Society?

First is the problem whether in the process of self-determination, which in Europe fissioned the German, Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires and which is now at a peak in Asia, every racial and linguistic group will insist it must attain the status of an independent nation to satisfy its aspirations. If it does, then the Indian subcontinent might disintegrate into a congeries of disparate states, as happened before. Then, too, the new Malayan Federation, which gained its independence from Britain on August 31, would have to be split into autonomous communities of Malays, Chinese and Indians (mostly from South India) who compose its population; and so would Singapore, until now an important trade center and British strategic base, which is henceforth to have self-government. And in all the countries of Southeast Asia which have Chinese settlers, from Thailand to the Philippines, the allegiance of these settlers to China, whether Communist or Nationalist, would be a political time-bomb threatening the stability of new nations which want to have an independent policy and might repress or oust the overseas Chinese.

Faced by the dangers of interracial

and interlinguistic strife, some Asians are wondering about the possibility of developing multiracial societies which would substitute allegiance to a culture for allegiance to an outside nation. Culture, rather than political nationalism, as the basis of a people's identity is discussed in an interesting report of the All-Party Committee of the Singapore Legislative Assembly on *Chinese Education*, published in 1956. "Without culture as the basis of its racial existence," says the report, "no people could preserve its identity and racial dignity." It therefore proposes that the Chinese, like other racial groups, should have the opportunity through their particular culture to contribute "to the formation of a nation marching rapidly towards self-government and independence, not jettisoning its cultural ideals and values, but by tolerance and ready acceptance of other races and sinking communal differences and jealousies, playing a significant if not predominant part in shaping a common ideology, and embracing political entity and common outlook, which are inseparable features for national existence."

Singapore practices what it preaches by having in its government a Chinese chief minister, a Malay deputy chief minister, an Indian minister of commerce and industry and a Chinese minister of education. But the Malayan Federation is wary about a union with Singapore, fearing that such a union would establish the predominance of the Chinese over the Malays—and enhance the danger of communism in the Federation through Chinese attachment to Peiping. At best, it will take time and

(Continued on page 192)



Franco and Spanish Unrest

by Herbert L. Matthews

Mr. Matthews has been with *The New York Times* since 1922, and since 1949 has served as a member of its editorial staff, covering Latin American and Spanish affairs. He is the author of *The Yoke and the Arrows: A Report on Spain* (New York, Braziller, 1957) and "The U.S. and Latin America," *Headline Series* No. 100 (New York, Foreign Policy Association, July 1953).

Hope springs eternal in the Spanish breast. How often in the years since the end of the Spanish Civil War in 1939, and especially since the end of World War II, have we heard predictions that the regime of Generalissimo Francisco Franco is now about to fall!

It would be cruel to make fun of these thus-far lost hopes, for they are based on the longings of fine, sincere and patriotic people, of men and women who want liberty and an end to a one-man military dictatorship. It would also be unsafe. In the first place, General Franco, the *Caudillo* ("leader") of Spain, is approaching 65 and is not immortal. In the second place the violent and brave character of the Spanish people and the extent and depth of the opposition to the *Caudillo* are such that a sudden explosion and overthrow are by no means to be ruled out.

And now we have another crop of rumors and hopes based upon certain events and certain apparent trends. There are also those who believe that Franco himself is preparing for the inevitable transition of power. Yet, when we look at these developments closely, they do not add up to really solid trends. How much the wish seems father to the thought.

Let us see what has happened since the beginning of the year. There has undoubtedly been a background of serious unrest, manifested openly by students and intellectuals and most acutely in Barcelona. The effects of an accelerated inflation on an already weakened and unbalanced economy have brought distress to many sectors

of the Spanish population and, hence, still greater discontent.

The year began with student riots in Barcelona and a boycott, by the people of that great and unhappy capital of Catalonia, of the subway, streetcars and buses. The population reacted, peacefully and effectively, against a rise in fares. As in Chile later, this measure was a last straw that broke public patience. Wages had been raised twice during 1956, but prices rose even faster.

Economic Distress

The unrest and the boycotts spread to Seville and Madrid, with the students, as usual, in the vanguard. Spain still has an essentially agricultural economy, but partly through mismanagement and backward methods and partly through natural disasters of frosts and droughts, the vital crops of wheat, olive oil and citrus fruits have been deficient. The Franco regime has never corrected the social and economic injustices of the latifundia (the great landholdings, often held by absentee landowners) in the south and the minifundia (the too-small holdings) in the north. There are a very few rich Spaniards, percentagewise, and a vast majority of very poor Spaniards.

The financial evidences of inflation—currency in circulation, weakness of the peseta, credit expansion, unbalanced budget, trade deficit—are clear enough, although they do not suffice in themselves to signify a disastrous economic situation. In Spain, as in France, there is something approaching an industrial boom. Tak-

ing a long-range view, even agricultural production is expanding slowly and the perennial problem of water shortage is gradually being eased by new reservoirs, hydroelectric plants and irrigation. A whole large section in the western province of Badajoz in Estremadura is being made fertile for the first time by dams and canals.

The United States is pouring more money into Spain. Another \$20 million in economic assistance was granted at the end of June. This supplements \$50 million previously granted during the past fiscal year under defense-support aid. In all, since the military and economic agreement of 1953 the United States has given \$300 million worth of economic aid. In addition, there is our air- and naval-base program, initially estimated to cost \$400 million; but it will probably come nearer to \$500 million.

Poverty has been built into the Spanish economy. The great majority of Spanish peasants and workers have never known anything else. Consequently they can take a strain in the form of a low standard of living better than most European countries. Moreover, General Franco proved in the desperately poor years of World War II and the period of austerity which followed that he can remain in power even when economic conditions are very bad.

The most that can be said is that poverty and economic distress add to the forces of opposition which could get behind an uprising or a serious movement against the *Caudillo*. When individuals are placed in a

position where they have little or nothing to lose they are potentially dangerous.

In the first two weeks of April the government quietly put through a series of major price increases affecting virtually every aspect of the nation's economy. There was no corresponding rise in wages. In fact, the price increases were largely the result of the wage increases of 1956. The result has been more popular discontent.

In February 1957 Generalissimo Franco, in an apparent effort to give the impression that major changes were at last under way, had, in fact, made one of his most spectacular gestures of recent years. This was a drastic cabinet reshuffle, which was made public on February 25. At the same time, the government announced some proposed reforms in the future administration of Spain.

Like so many political developments in Spain during the last 18 years since the Civil War ended, this seemingly important and drastic move by General Franco was more apparent than real. The basic fact of the Spanish political situation has been and still is that the regime is a one-man show. For all practical purposes Generalissimo Francisco Franco is the government of Spain. Changing cabinet ministers brings differences of emphasis, degree and detail, but essentially it changes nothing. Franco did not give up one iota of his power. He did not give any reason to believe that he intends to do so while he is alive and well.

It was announced that at some time in the future the posts of Head of the State and Head of the Government, now combined in the person of General Franco, would be separated; but when, as and if this happens, the *Caudillo* will certainly remain Head of the State, and the premier will be under his orders.

Because several important Monarchists were appointed to the new cabinet, some observers thought they detected a cautious move by Franco toward the long-promised re-establishment of the monarchy. The generalissimo has played a cat-and-mouse game with the Monarchists from the beginning. On the one hand, he pledged himself in the Law of Succession of 1947 to restore the monarchy; on the other, he has consistently refused even to signify which candidate he intends to appoint—the 43-year-old father, Don Juan of Bourbon-Battenberg, who lives in exile in Portugal, or the 19-year-old son, Prince Juan Carlos, who is being educated in Spain.

Monarchists' Chances

As a result, the Monarchists have been bitter and resentful against Franco. On June 17 there was quite a stir when a prominent Monarchist, the Count of Ruisenada, published an article favorable to the *Caudillo*. This was supposed to mean that an important bloc of Monarchists was making its peace with the Franco regime. On July 16 Reuters news agency achieved front-page prominence in *The New York Times* and other newspapers when Luis Carrero Blanco, minister in charge of General Franco's office, told the Cortes in Madrid that when the *Caudillo* died or gave up power he would be replaced by a monarchy. This meant exactly nothing, since the generalissimo was already pledged to do this by the Law of Succession. Such are the straws of news at which Spaniards grasp in these unhappy days.

The generalissimo is not going to be moved one way or another by such approaches. He is just about as immovable, impenetrable and impassive as a sphinx.

Some observers, for instance, saw a weakening of the Falange, Spain's

only authorized political movement, in the cabinet reshuffle of February 25. Even if that were true, next month or next year the *Caudillo* could bring them back, as he has done off and on in the past.

Looking back now with the hindsight that a half-year provides, about the only significance of the cabinet change lay in the entry of the lay Catholic organization, Opus Dei, into the political arena. Several of the new ministers, a few of the under-secretaries and the secretary-general of the Ministry of Information were known members of this powerful organization, and some others were certainly sympathizers.

This was the first time that Opus Dei came openly into Spanish politics. The organization was formed as far back as 1928, and in 1950 it became the first and only secular institution anywhere to receive the *Decretum laudis* of the Vatican. While it is a world-wide organization, with branches in the United States among other countries, its strength is primarily in Spain.

Members take a pledge of celibacy, chastity, poverty and obedience. In reality, there are married members and many who live in anything but poverty. The importance of Opus Dei lies in its hold on intellectuals, especially in the field of education. Insofar as any element in Spain can be said to represent Christian Democracy or Christian Socialism in the European sense, Opus Dei does so. However, it is an elite, and its enemies suspect it of being very right-wing.

Spain, which in one sense is the most Catholic of all countries, is, in another, the most anticlerical. This is a natural phenomenon. Anticlericalism was especially widespread among the former Republicans, Socialists, Anarcho-Syndicalists and Communists, and among the men-

folk of the peasant population. While Franco has destroyed all organized opposition, the same degree of anticlericalism, or at least a high degree, remains among these same people. The Spanish Republican exiles, with the exception of the Basques, are especially anticlerical. Consequently, the rise of Opus Dei has aroused intense emotion and suspicion.

Of course, Opus Dei, like the Falange, the Monarchists, the army, the landowners and businessmen, cannot exercise any real power today. Nobody and no element can, so long as Francisco Franco is *Caudillo*. Since the Catholic Church in Spain is already all-powerful in education and in all forms of the printed word, it is hard to see how Opus Dei can make much difference in present circumstances. What it can do and presumably is doing is to prepare its positions for the inevitable end of the Franco dictatorship.

When that time comes there will be a general scramble, and no one can say today what role Opus Dei will be able to play. What is significant is simply that Opus Dei has at last entered politics.

No Organized Opposition

One other development of some importance in the first half-year of 1957 has to be noted. It was dramatized toward the end of May by the arrest of some very prominent individuals, mostly intellectuals. Among these were Dionisio Ridruejo, poet and one of the founders of the Falange; Francisco Herrera, journalist and brother of the famous "liberal" Bishop of Malaga; Antonio Menchaca, Basque Monarchist; Javier Satrustegui, also a Basque Monarchist from one of the wealthiest and best-known industrial families of the region; Victor Pradera, a leading Falangist; Valentin Lopez Aparicio, a former Republic army officer; En-

rique Tierno, professor of constitutional law at Salamanca University, and a number of others.

This was, indeed, a sensational development and it drew attention to the seriousness of the opposition that Generalissimo Franco faces. These were presumably victims chosen as examples to stem the tide of unrest that has been sweeping over Spain for a long time. The men are to be tried on charges of having connections with Republican leaders abroad for the purpose of overthrowing the Franco regime. None of them, certainly, has any connection with Communists or communism. In fact, they represent a right-wing opposition.

They were rash, clumsy and amateurish, and by what passes for law in Spain they presumably had committed "crimes." If anything, their activities and the *Caudillo's* reaction prove that he will no more brook any opposition now than he would before. It is also obvious that he has the complete power to suppress such opposition. Finally, it is surely clear that there is not and cannot be in present circumstances any serious organized opposition to Generalissimo Franco. He is supreme.

One therefore ends just about where one began. There is nothing in the situation today to offer any real hope of a voluntary change by General Franco or of his overthrow.

And yet one must always make a proviso in writing or thinking about Spain today. It has been pointed out innumerable times that the *Caudillo* is sitting on a lid. The outward or surface appearance, even in Spain, is one of tranquillity and apathy. However, underneath that surface an explosive brew seethes and boils. The Spanish are a brave, fanatical people who cherish individual liberty. They have been patient for 18 years because of the grievous wounds suffered in the Spanish Civil War of

1936-1939. Whatever happens, they do not want another such fratricidal struggle. Yet they are a passionate, violent people when driven to desperation or when aroused by great national issues.

Therefore, no one can predict what will happen. The end will come, sooner or later, since all dictatorships must end, but when or how cannot be foretold. On the basis of present information there is nothing to do but wait and watch.

READING SUGGESTIONS: A number of new books on Spain have been published in the United States this year. In the political field are *The Yoke and the Arrows*, by Herbert L. Matthews (New York, Braziller, 1957); and *Pagan Spain*, by Richard Wright (New York, Harper, 1957). Among the recent books about the Spanish people and land are *Kings Without Castles*, by Lucy H. Crockett (New York, Rand McNally, 1957); and *The Road to Santiago*, by Walter Starkie (New York, Dutton, 1957). *Spain*, a standard work by E. Allison Peers (London, Methuen, 1956), has been revised in an enlarged fifth edition.

FPA Bookshelf

Glad Adventure, by Francis Bowes Sayre. New York, Macmillan, 1957. \$6.00.

An intimate autobiography of the former High Commissioner of the Philippines, an American whose life has been dedicated to public service for his country and humanity. The drastic changes the world has undergone in his lifetime are reflected in his personal story, interestingly written and throwing light upon events and people that have shaped 20th-century history.

Race and Culture Contacts in the Modern World, by E. Franklin Frazier. New York, Knopf, 1957. \$6.00.

A comprehensive study of race relations throughout the world for the last 200 years. The author, a former president of the American Sociological Society, now head of the sociology department at Howard University, believes that racial problems are "one aspect of the total cultural problem created by the expansion overseas of European civilization," and predicts that "as imperialism and colonialism based upon color disappear, racial and cultural differentiation without implications of superiority and inferiority will become the basic pattern of a world order."

Waging Peace, by C. Maxwell Stanley. New York, Macmillan, 1956. \$4.50.

Mr. Stanley, a Midwestern businessman and engineer, pleads for a more positive plan to achieve the kind of world we want. One of the main points of his plan to accomplish this in a peaceful way is for United States businessmen to invest capital

abroad and "undertake all phases [of development] which it can handle properly."

American Nationalism, by Hans Kohn. New York, Macmillan, 1957. \$5.00.

Long a student of comparative nationalism, Professor Kohn of the City College of New York presents in this book a pioneering essay, interpreting American nationalism. While only in part historical, the author's treatment traces the ideological origins and development of the American nation. This valuable and interesting book concludes by focusing on the challenge the United States faces as a nation among nations.

BOOKS ON GERMANY

Of interest to the general reader as well as the student are two recent books on Germany. *Adenauer: His Authorized Biography*, by Paul Weymar (New York, Dutton, 1957, \$5.95), although at times so deeply sympathetic as to be nonobjective, is extremely interesting; well written and informative. *The History of Germany: From the Reformation to the Present*, by Minna R. Falk (New York, Philosophical Library, 1957, \$6.00), "emphasizes factual material essential to an understanding of modern Germany." Its author, an associate professor of European history at New York University, served three years with the military government in Germany and Austria.

Spotlight

(Continued from page 188)

patience to ease existing tensions and dissipate mutual fears. But a new answer to unbridled nationalism is in the making.

Socialism — or Private Enterprise?

The second old problem for which a new answer is emerging is the question whether an underdeveloped country, newly liberated from colonial rule, should modernize its econo-

my primarily through government endeavor or give free play to private enterprise.

The postcolonial governments of Asia believe that long-term projects, such as dams, roads, railways, irrigation facilities and certain basic industries which cannot bring financial returns for years to come, must be built by the state if they are to be built at all; and their opinion is shared by Western businessmen familiar with Asian conditions. But there is little or no addiction to doctrines for the sake of doctrines. Instead the Asian nations today, like Japan half a century ago, want to select those ideas and techniques which are best suited to their own special needs—whether these ideas and techniques come from capitalism, socialism or communism. They are still at the stage of learning their economic ABC's and are ready to look at any textbook which will accelerate their training. This now makes it possible for thoughtful Asians to judge the world's various economic systems on their merits—not, as they did right after independence, on their past connection or lack of connection with Western colonialism.

And, third, the Asian countries increasingly recognize that they do not have the resources at this stage of development to keep up defenses ade-

quate for modern warfare and, at the same time, to raise their peoples' pitifully low standards of living. Must they, for years to come, rely on one great-power bloc or another for their protection, thereby incurring the distrust or outright hostility of the other?

New View of United Nations

One senses among Asians, both the neutralists and those who have been hitherto aligned with the United States, a desire to benefit by what both blocs have to offer—to make the best of both worlds without becoming permanently tied to either. This does not mean, as is often assumed in the United States, that the Asians have no moral standards about world affairs. They do, and practice them as keenly as Westerners, although in a different historical context. But many are looking beyond national and regional arrangements to the United Nations, whose prestige in Asia has been greatly enhanced by the Suez episode and the creation of the UN Emergency Force.

Twelve years after World War II Asia is astir in a new way—no longer negatively, against Western colonialism, but positively, for a better life and greater security as a part of the world community.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The third of a series of articles on Asia.)

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In this issue:

The Hungarian Revolution and the UN— E. Lengyel.....	185
Status of the President's Leadership— N. Stanford.....	187
In Asia: Old Problems—New Answers— V. M. Dean.....	188
Franco and Spanish Unrest— H. L. Matthews.....	189
FPA Bookshelf.....	191

In the next issue:

A Foreign Policy Forum— Is the UN in Our National Interest? Clark M. Eichelberger Hans J. Morgenthau	
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